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A widespread objection to the introduction of consumption tax systems claims that this would 
lead to high tax revenue losses. This paper investigates the revenue effects of a consumption 
tax reform in Germany. Our results suggest that the revenue losses would be surprisingly low. 
We find a maximum revenue loss of 1.6 percent of annual GDP. In some years, we even find 
a tax revenue gain. This implies that the current tax system collects little revenue from taxing 
the normal return to capital. Based on these results, we calculate a macroeconomic measure of 
the effective tax rate on capital income. 
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applies. 1 Introduction
In the academic debate on the appropriate income tax base, the question of whether
or not capital income should be taxed is a key issue. According to the concept of
comprehensive income taxation (Schanz (1896), Haig (1921) and Simons (1938)),
both capital and labour income should be part of the tax base. Advocates of
consumption tax systems (see e.g. Fisher & Fisher (1942)), in contrast, argue that
the normal return to investment should be exempt from tax.
Most existing tax systems are based on the principle of comprehensive income
taxation. But recent tax reforms have reduced the tax burden on capital income
relative to other types of income. Examples for this trend include the introduction
of tax exemptions for retirement savings in the U.S. and many other countries and
the move toward dual income taxation in the Scandinavian countries. As a result,
existing tax systems include elements of both the traditional comprehensive income
tax concept and the consumption tax approach. For many observers, though, these
hybrid systems do not go far enough, and several tax reform proposals suggest the
introduction of pure consumption tax systems1.
In the literature, the advantages and disadvantages of consumption tax reforms
have been discussed extensively. While advocates of consumption taxation point
to the e¢ ciency losses and adverse growth e⁄ects caused by capital income taxes,
critics point out that consumption tax systems are vulnerable to income shifting,
that a switch to consumption taxes would have undesirable distributional e⁄ects
and that it may give rise to tax revenue losses.
Compared to the extensive theoretical debate on consumption tax reforms,
relatively little empirical work has been done in this area. This paper focuses on
one important empirical aspect of consumption tax reforms: the e⁄ects on tax
revenue. Estimating the tax revenue di⁄erence between the existing tax system
and a hypothetical consumption tax system is interesting for two reasons. Firstly,
consumption tax reform proposals will be unsuccessful in the political process if
the expected tax revenue losses are too high. Secondly, the tax revenue di⁄erence
between the existing tax system and a hypothetical consumption tax system may
be interpreted as a measure of the tax burden on the normal return to capital
(Gordon, Kalambokidis & Slemrod (2004a)).
In the literature, empirical work on the tax revenue e⁄ects of consumption tax
reforms mostly focuses on the United Kingdom and the United States. Meade
(1978, p. 261⁄.) estimates the tax revenue from di⁄erent consumption based tax
systems. Gordon & Slemrod (1988) compare the tax revenue generated under the
existing tax system in the U.S. to the tax revenue that would be generated by an
1See e.g. Meade (1978), Hall & Rabushka (1995) or, for Germany, Rose (2003) or Mitschke
(2004).
1R-base type cash ￿ ow tax. They ￿nd that, in 1983, the US government would
have increased tax revenue by implementing a cash ￿ ow tax system. Gordon,
Kalambokidis & Slemrod (2004a) and Gordon, Kalambokidis, Rohaly & Slemrod
(2004) replicate and extend the analysis by applying it to data for the years 1995
and 2004. It turns out that a switch to a consumption based tax systems in 1995
or 2004 would have induced a considerable loss in tax revenue. The di⁄erence in
results is partly explained by business cycle e⁄ects.
This paper uses the approach introduced by Gordon & Slemrod (1988) to
investigate the tax revenue e⁄ects of introducing a consumption tax system in
Germany. For the time period between 1977 and 1998, we ask how tax revenue
would have been a⁄ected if the tax base had been that of a consumption tax
system. We extend the approach used in Gordon & Slemrod (1988) by considering
an S-base type cash ￿ ow tax, next to the R-base tax.
Our analysis leads to the following results. Firstly, the revenue from taxing
capital income collected by the German tax system between 1977 and 1998 is
remarkably low, i.e. the revenue losses caused by switching to a consumption tax
system would be low as well. For instance, in 1983 and 1986, we ￿nd that the
revenue from taxing capital income in Germany was e⁄ectively close to zero. For
the 1990s, this number is positive but still fairly low, with a maximum of 1,6% of
GDP. Secondly, the revenue di⁄erence is quite volatile and strongly in￿ uenced by
business cycle conditions. Thirdly, the volatility of the tax revenue losses or gains
depends on the type of consumption tax system under consideration. Under an
R-base, the tax revenue di⁄erence to the existing tax system would be much more
volatile than under an S-base.
The rest of the paper is set up as follows. In the following section, we describe
the theoretical basis of our approach. In section 3, we present the results of the
empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses some limitations of the analysis and eco-
nomic questions raised by the results. In section 5, we use our results to calculate a
macroeconomic measure of the tax burden on capital income. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Theoretical Framework
In this section, we describe the theoretical basis of our empirical analysis. Our
approach follows Gordon & Slemrod (1988) and extends the analysis by considering
an S-base, next to the R-Base. It is helpful to discuss the ￿rm level and the
household level separately.
22.1 The ￿rm level
Consider a ￿rm operating in period t, which owns real assets including inventories
(Kt) and ￿nancial assets (Bt). The latter yield a ￿nancial income ￿tBt￿1, where
￿t is the rate of return. Income from real assets is denoted as Ft. The two asset
types depreciate with rates ￿
K and ￿
B, respectively. The ￿rm￿ s debt Gt gives rise
to interest payments of itGt￿1 where it is the interest rate. The ￿rm may issue new
shares Nt ￿ Nt￿1, it pays dividends ￿t; and direct taxes Tt. The ￿rm￿ s cash-￿ ow
equation in period t is given by:




t + itGt￿1 + ￿t + Tt (1)
where IK
t is gross real investment and IB
t is ￿nancial investment. Note that
I
K











2.1.1 The status quo tax system
Under the current tax system, income from both real and ￿nancial assets is subject
to tax whereas interest on debt and depreciation allowances may be deducted from
the tax base. Tax payments under the current tax system (T C
t ) are thus given by:
T
C
t = u(Ft + ￿tBt￿1 ￿ itGt￿1 ￿ Dt) (3)
where Dt stands for depreciation deductions and u is the statutory tax rate on
pro￿ts (including local taxes).
2.1.2 Consumption tax systems
There are many ways of introducing consumption tax systems in practice. We
consider two types of corporate income taxes which may be used to construct
a consumption tax system: an R-based tax system which only taxes cash ￿ ows
from real activities and an S-based system which also taxes ￿nancial cash ￿ ows.
Although both systems imply intertemporal neutrality of the tax system, their
e⁄ects on tax revenue may be quite di⁄erent.
The R-base tax system An R-base tax system (see Meade (1978)) excludes
￿nancial income from the tax base, disallows interest deductions and replaces
depreciation deductions by expensing for new investment in real assets and in-
ventories. Denote the tax revenue in period t under a hypothetical R-based tax
system by T R
t . Tax revenue T R





























t denotes the tax base e⁄ect in case of an R-base tax reform.
The S-base tax system According to Meade (1978), an S-base tax system
only levies tax on the cash ￿ ow related to share capital ￿ owing from ￿rms to ￿rm
owners, i.e. dividends net of newly issued shares.2 Using (1) and setting Tt = 0,
the S-base can be written as




t + Gt ￿ Gt￿1 ￿ itGt￿1 (6)
(6) shows that the S-base tax is equivalent to a tax base which would tax both
real and ￿nancial income and any increase in debt and allow for an immediate
deduction of real and ￿nancial investment. In the empirical analysis, we will
calculate the right hand side of (6). The tax payment under the S-base tax can









t + Gt ￿ Gt￿1 ￿ itGt￿1
￿
(7)






































This di⁄erence is zero if investment in ￿nancial assets is equal to the return to
these assets (IB
t = ￿Bt￿1) and debt grows at the rate of interest. These conditions
may hold under the assumptions of perfect capital market and in a steady state
where the growth rate of the capital stock equals the rate of interest. But, as
the subsequent analysis will show, they do not hold empirically for the time span
under consideration, so that the S-base di⁄ers considerably from the R-base.
2.2 The household level
So far, we have only considered taxes at the ￿rm level. But under the current
system, capital income is also taxed at the household level. The household￿ s budget
constraint can be written as
2The tax reform proposal for Germany made by Mitschke (2004) also uses the S-base system.
4Ct + St = Y
L
t + itAt￿1 + ￿t + Mt ￿ T
h
t (10)
The household spends available income on consumption Ct and savings St.
Income consists of labour income denoted by Y L
t , interest income itAt￿1, dividends
from domestic ￿rms ￿t and other types of income which we summarize under Mt.
The latter may include dividends from foreign ￿rms, income from personally held
real estate investment, from retirement bene￿ts and more. Under the consumption
tax systems discussed above, dividends as well as interest income would be exempt
from personal income taxation. Under all tax systems, labour income would be
subject to tax.3 The tax treatment of the other income components in the current
German tax system will be discussed further below.
3 Empirical Evidence
3.1 The data
For the analysis at the ￿rm level, we use data from the balance sheet data pool
of the German Federal Reserve Bank. For some earlier years we just have data on
West Germany. Table 1 describes the data sample.
3Introducing a consumption tax system would also require changes in other parts of the tax
system, in particular inheritance taxation. Pursuing these issues in greater detail, though, would
be beyond the scope of this paper.
5Table 1: Descriptive Statistic
Year Total assets interest rate
(bn DM) real assets debt real assets financial assets (%)
1972 1 037,5 64,1% 76,3% 111,3 47,7 8,2
1973 1 113,3 64,4% 77,0% 116,6 34,2 9,5
1974 1 162,4 64,3% 77,4% 97,5 27,7 10,6
1975 1 188,0 63,6% 77,4% 74,2 27,0 8,7
1976 1 291,6 62,9% 77,8% 129,1 56,3 8,0
1977 1 332,8 61,1% 78,0% 76,8 48,8 6,4
1978 1 419,5 61,0% 78,6% 130,8 45,6 6,1
1979 1 533,9 60,5% 79,4% 147,5 63,5 7,6
1980 1 632,4 61,3% 80,3% 164,2 36,1 8,6
1981 1 707,3 60,8% 81,3% 129,8 54,0 10,6
1982 1 720,3 60,5% 81,6% 100,5 25,5 9,1
1983 1 792,1 58,9% 81,8% 116,8 74,3 8,0
1984 1 886,3 57,3% 81,8% 135,0 83,4 7,8
1985 1 940,1 56,4% 81,8% 125,8 57,4 6,9
1986 1 982,6 55,9% 81,1% 128,8 48,0 6,0
1987 2 081,1 55,6% 80,7% 170,6 64,1 5,8
1988 2 206,7 54,8% 80,9% 185,3 84,9 6,0
1989 2 398,3 54,3% 81,6% 236,2 111,2 7,1
1990 2 596,2 53,7% 81,8% 247,4 121,9 8,9
1991 2 868,9 53,1% 82,1% 297,7 164,9 8,7
1992 2 963,8 52,0% 81,7% 198,1 98,9 8,1
1993 3 005,3 51,2% 82,4% 182,5 65,8 6,4
1994 3 054,5 49,6% 82,3% 154,7 97,8 6,7
1995 3 091,3 49,0% 81,8% 174,0 58,0 6,5
1996 3 130,9 48,3% 81,8% 162,2 67,3 5,6
1997 3 217,0 48,0% 81,4% 202,1 75,5 5,1
1997 3 497,7 50,6% 82,1% 205,6 79,7 5,1
1998 3 715,0 50,0% 81,9% 293,4 158,4 4,5
1999 3 980,8 49,1% 82,0% 309,8 199,0 4,3
2000 4 214,0 47,9% 82,3% 284,2 202,9 5,4
2001 4 314,9 47,5% 81,9% 246,0 114,7 4,8
of which: Investment (bn DM) in:
West Germany
Germany (West and East)
During the period covered by the data, there is a slight increase in the debt-
asset ratio4 and a signi￿cant decline in the share of real assets in overall assets.
The latter is in particular due to a massive increase in ￿nancial assets held by
￿rms. The reader should note that the data we use is based on German GAAP
Balance Sheets (Handelsbilanz), not on tax return data. Under German tax law,
the German GAAP accounting rules are, in principle, also binding for tax account-
ing ("Ma￿ geblichkeitsprinzip"). But there are some exceptions to this rule, so that
there may be deviations between the two types of accounting.5
4A considerable part of the ￿rms￿debt takes the form of book reserves, in particular reserves
for future pension obligations. Throughout this paper, we treat these book reserves as ordinary
debt.
5Pro￿t tax payments reported in German GAAP micro data are usually slightly lower than
suggested by reported pro￿ts, which implies that taxable pro￿ts are somewhat lower than pro￿ts
6In order to assess the e⁄ects on taxes levied at the household level, we use
German Statistical O¢ ce income tax data. This data includes information on
personal capital income, i.e. interest income and dividends as well as certain types
of realized capital gains.6. Moreover, it includes data on personal income from real
estate investment and data on tax credits for corporate taxes paid on distributed
pro￿ts. Unfortunately, this data is only available for every third year and only for
the period 1977-1998.
As in the preceding section, we start at the ￿rm level and then add the e⁄ects
arising at the household level. Since the tax rates on both the ￿rm and the
household level vary over time and across individuals, we ￿rst compute the e⁄ects
for the tax bases (subsections 3.3 and 3.4) and then add the tax rate (subsection
3.5). Since we do not have balance sheet data from the banking sector, we have to
assume that banks are taxed as in the current system and are una⁄ected by the
tax reforms under consideration.
3.2 Tax base e⁄ects at the Firm Level
In order to compute the tax bases ￿CR
t and ￿CS
t as presented in equations (5) and
(8), we need to de￿ne the following variables: IK
t is investment in real assets which
is computed by comparing the stocks of di⁄erent capital assets in two sequential
periods and adding the depreciation deductions for these assets. The same method
is applied to ￿nancial assets:
I
K




t = Bt ￿ Bt￿1 + D
B
t (11)
The depreciation deductions Dt can be taken directly from the data. In order
to calculate the revenue e⁄ects of switching to the R-base, we also need data on
income from ￿nancial assets (￿Bt￿1). In the balance sheet data, interest earnings
("Zinsertr￿ge") are reported. In the following, we will assume that these interest
earnings include all income from ￿nancial assets which is taxed under the existing
tax system. These interest payments are relatively low, given the stock of ￿nancial
assets held by ￿rms. This suggests that there may be returns to the ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial
assets other than interest payments. Of course, part of the ￿nancial assets held
by ￿rms may be cash balances or loans to clients which do not produce interest
income. Moreover, the income on ￿nancial assets may take the form of capital
gains. If taxable income from ￿nancial assets exceeds interest earnings reported
in the data, our approach underestimates the revenue losses caused by a switch to
an R-base. The estimate for the S-base is not a⁄ected.
according to German GAAP. Given this, our analysis slightly overestimates the revenue losses
of switching to a consumption tax system.
6See §20EStG (German Income Tax Law).
7Figure 1 shows the tax base e⁄ects ￿CR
t and ￿CS
t for the years between 1972
and 2001 ("West"-Germany for 1972-1997 and "total" Germany for 1997-2001).
Positive (negative) values mean that a consumption tax reform would yield a loss



















Figure 1 shows that a switch to a consumption tax system would have reduced
the tax base in some but not all years. This holds for the S-base and in particular
for the R-base. Moreover, the tax base e⁄ects are much more volatile in the case
of the R-base. This di⁄erence between the two systems will be discussed further
below.
3.3 Adding the tax base e⁄ects at the household level
The German income tax law di⁄erentiates between seven types of income which
are subject to tax at the household level. These include income from agriculture
(E1), non-incorporated business (E2), self-employment (E3), employment (E4),
￿nancial assets (E5), rent and leasing (E6) and other income including certain
types of retirement bene￿ts (E7). The taxation of business income is covered by
the ￿rm level analysis in the preceding section. Income from employment and self-
employment is essentially labour income. What we have not taken into account
so far is personal income from ￿nancial assets (E5), income from rent and leasing
(E6), which is mainly generated by personally held real estate investment, and
retirement bene￿ts (E7). We can express the household￿ s budget constraint under











o = Ct + St (12)
8where fE is the (non-linear) income tax function,
P7
h=1 Eh is the tax base and.
Eo stands for income which is not subject to taxes (like grants etc.).
Personal income from ￿nancial assets, which essentially consists of interest
income and dividends, is subject to tax under the current tax system. Under an
R-based tax system, ￿nancial investment would be tax exempt. Under an S-based
tax system, personally held ￿nancial investment would be taxed in the same way
as ￿nancial investment at the ￿rm level. Since we have no data on net ￿nancial
investment or net withdrawals from bank accounts at the personal level, we assume
(following Gordon, Kalambokidis & Slemrod (2004a)) that income from ￿nancial
investment at the personal level is untaxed.
Besides, we have to take into account that, between 1977 and 2000, Germany
had an imputation system for the taxation of corporate pro￿ts. Corporate taxes
paid on distributed pro￿ts where credited against personal income taxes. In a
consumption tax system, there would be no credits for taxes paid at the corporate
level. We therefore have to take into account the revenue costs of this tax credit
under the old system.
A more complex question is how we should deal with income from rent and
leasing. Taxable income from rent and leasing is negative in our dataset, except for
1977 and 1980. This is because there are considerable tax incentives for investment
in real estate. One example is accelerated depreciation on housing capital. These
incentives are often seen as a means of compensating for rent regulation which acts
as a break on real estate investment. The question is whether these tax subsidies
would have to be replaced by explicit subsidies under a consumption tax system.
Another di¢ culty is that we do not have data on tax depreciation and interest
deductions for housing investment made by private households, so that we cannot
calculate the tax base e⁄ects of switching to a consumption tax system for this
type of income. We therefore simply assume that this income is tax exempt. We
will discuss the consequences of relaxing this assumption in section 4. Finally, we
also leave unchanged the treatment of income from retirement bene￿ts (E7). Given
this, the tax base di⁄erence between the current system and the consumption tax
system is simply E5 + E6.
We may now calculate the overall tax base di⁄erence by adding the tax base
e⁄ects at the ￿rm level and the household level. While our ￿rm level data is
available on a yearly basis, data for taxable income from ￿nancial assets at the
household level is available only in three year intervals and only for the time
period 1977￿1995 for West-Germany and for 1998 for Germany as a whole. Table
2 summarizes the results for the household and the ￿rm level for these years.
91977 (West) 1980 (West) 1983 (West) 1986 (West) 1989 (West) 1992 (West) 1995 (West) 1998 (Total)
Income from capital (E5) -7,90 -16,16 -19,30 -25,11 -30,57 -52,40 -31,97 -43,33
Incom from rent and leasing (E6) -9,83 -11,88 27,67 28,02 6,88 10,00 18,62 28,24
Sum -17,73 -28,04 8,37 2,91 -23,69 -42,40 -13,35 -15,10
CR Firm 31,44 -26,70 36,86 34,68 -47,53 57,26 63,29 -8,42
CR Sum 13,72 -54,74 45,22 37,59 -71,22 14,86 49,94 -23,52
CS Firm -7,78 -6,89 -9,99 -22,68 -18,85 -28,35 -20,62 -47,43
CS Sum -25,51 -34,93 -1,62 -19,78 -42,54 -70,76 -33,97 -62,53
Table 2: Tax base effects in billion DM at the household and the firm level
The numbers in table 2 have to be interpreted as follows. For instance, in 1998,
a consumption tax reform would have decreased the tax base by approximately
15 billion DM at the personal level. At the ￿rm level, there is an additional tax
base decrease of 8,4 billion, so that the overall increase in the tax base ("CR
sum") would have been 23,5 billion DM (12 billion e). In the case of an S-base
consumption tax system, in contrast, the tax base at the ￿rm level would have
been smaller and the overall tax base e⁄ect amounts to over 62 billion DM (32
billion e). Table 2 also shows that the tax base e⁄ects are very volatile. We will
discuss the di⁄erences between the S-base and the R-base and the reasons for the
volatility of the tax base e⁄ects in greater detail in section 4.
3.4 Total e⁄ects on tax revenue
In this section, we try to assess the revenue e⁄ects of a reform towards an R-base
or an S-base. In order to calculate the revenue e⁄ects in a precise manner, we
would need micro data which allows to determine marginal tax rates for every
￿rm and every household in every period. Since we do not have this data, we
simply use top marginal tax rates for ￿rms and households. We thus overestimate
the revenue gains and losses of the tax reforms under consideration. Next to the
tax base e⁄ect, we also have to take into account the revenue e⁄ect of abolishing
the tax credit for corporate taxes paid which existed between 1977 and 2000.
Table 3 reports the changes in tax bases, the assumed tax rates (taken from
Devereux, Gri¢ th & Klemm (2002) and Fuest & Weichenrieder (2002)), the tax
credit and the revenue e⁄ects.
101983 (West) 1986 (West) 1989 (West) 1992 (West) 1995 (West) 1998 (Total)
Gain/Loss in tax base
firm level R 36,86 34,68 -47,53 57,26 63,29 -8,42
firm level S -9,99 -22,68 -18,85 -28,35 -20,62 -47,43
individual E5+E6 8,37 2,91 -23,69 -42,40 -13,35 -15,10
Assumed tax rates
firm level 62,56% 62,69% 62,73% 59,40% 56,55% 56,01%
individual level 56,00% 56,00% 56,00% 54,99% 56,98% 56,98%
Abolishment of imputation of corporate taxes
3,37 5,38 5,72 8,11 6,08 9,60
Tax revenue gain/loss
R-base 31,11 28,74 -37,36 18,80 34,27 -3,72
S-Base 1,81 -7,22 -19,37 -32,05 -13,18 -25,57
in % of annual GDP
R-base 1,8% 1,5% -1,6% 0,6% 1,0% -0,1%
S-Base 0,1% -0,4% -0,8% -1,0% -0,4% -0,7%
Table 3: Summary of the tax revenue effects in billion DM in case of a tax reform
towards an R- or S-base tax system
It turns out that the revenue e⁄ects of a switch to a consumption tax system
are not very large. Under the R-base, the maximum revenue loss observed in the
data is 1.6% of GDP (in 1989) and the largest revenue gain is 1.8% of GDP in 1983.
In the case of the S-base, the revenue losses attain a maximum of 1% of annual
GDP in 1992. Such a revenue loss could be compensated, for instance, by a 2.5
percentage point increase in the value added tax. In most years, the revenue losses
would have been much smaller, and for 1983 we ￿nd a small revenue increase.7
One should note that these revenue e⁄ects have been calculated on the basis of




Our analysis abstracts from taking into account behavioral adjustments which
would be caused by a switch to a consumption tax system. If these behavioral
adjustments are taken into account, it is likely that the tax revenue losses would be
smaller as investment and economic growth are expected to increase as a reaction
to consumption tax reforms. Our approach is thus likely to overestimate the
7In their analysis for the U.S., Gordon & Slemrod (1988) and Gordon, Kalambokidis &
Slemrod (2004a) ￿nd that under a simulated R-base tax, the tax liability would have increased
by $7,4 billion in 1983. In 1995, there would have been a loss in tax revenue of $108,1 billion,
i.e. approximately 1.5% of GDP.
11true revenue losses. A related issue is that the introduction of a consumption
tax revenue may also lead to new opportunities for tax evasion through income
shifting. For instance, under the R-base, there may be incentives to engage in
income shifting between real and ￿nancial income ￿ ows. This may well increase
the revenue losses. Investigating this in greater detail would be beyond the scope
of this paper.
4.2 R-base or S-base?
From a theoretical point of view, the revenue e⁄ects of switching to an R-base
should be the same as those of switching to an S-base, at least in the long term.
But our results for the two tax bases are very di⁄erent8. In particular, the revenue
e⁄ects of switching to an S-base are much less volatile. Moreover, in some years,
there are large di⁄erences between the revenue e⁄ects: For instance, in 1995, we
￿nd an increase in tax revenue amounting to 1% of GDP for the R-base and
a decline in revenue of 0:4% of GDP for the S-base. In order to capture the
di⁄erences between both systems systematically, recall equation (9). The tax base
di⁄erence ￿RS
t is due to deviations from the equilibrium path of investment in









￿ (Gt ￿ (1 + it)Gt￿1) (13)
Figure (2) shows the e⁄ects of both terms ("investment" and "debt") and the
di⁄erence ￿RS
t ("DIFF").
8Meade (1978) also states that "cyclically the two bases have di⁄erent e⁄ects", e.g. in 1974,
"the S basis is very much higher than the R basis" and he concludes that "the ￿gures for S for




















Investment West Debt West Investment Debt DIFF West DIFF
Figure 2: Di⁄erences between ￿CR and ￿CS due to investment in ￿nancial assets
and debt di⁄erentials.
Figure 2 shows that di⁄erences between the R-base and the S-base arise in
particular in years where the cash ￿ ow from ￿nancial investment was negative.
This was the case, for instance, in the 1990, where net investment in ￿nancial
assets at the ￿rm level was particularly high.
In practical terms, the S-base is probably easier to handle than the R-base.
One of the disadvantages of an R-based system is that it requires a sharp distinc-
tion between ￿nancial and non-￿nancial incomes. This distinction is particularly
di¢ cult to apply to banks. Banks typically charge for their services by charging
interest rates for loans which exceed those paid for deposits. Under an R-based
tax system, pro￿ts generated by the provision of ￿nancial services might therefore
go untaxed. The S-base avoids this di¢ culty by taxing real as well as ￿nancial
assets.
4.3 Business cycle e⁄ects
Gordon, Kalambokidis & Slemrod (2004a) explain the di⁄erence in revenue losses
between 1983 and 1995 for the U.S. by (1) the drop in interest rates, which lowers
the e⁄ect of disallowing interest deductions, and (2) the di⁄erent business cycle
conditions. It is clear that our results are also strongly a⁄ected by the business
cycle. Since investment is very volatile over the business cycle, a tax base which
allows for expensing will also be a⁄ected by business cycle conditions. We could
solve this problem by ￿ltering the time series in order to control for investment
13￿ uctuations. Unfortunately, we lack an appropriate data base since we do not have
yearly data for the household level.
We therefore illustrate the business cycle e⁄ects by concentrating on the ￿rm
level. Figure 3 depicts the time series for gross business investment, ￿CR
t (left scale)
and ￿CS
t (right scale) in billion DM. By simple graphical analysis, it becomes clear
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Figure 3: Gross investment, ￿CR
t and ￿CS
t .
The loss in tax base in 1995 is relatively low, as is investment, while the loss
1998 is relatively high, which is accompanied by high investment activity. As GKS
(2004) point out, investment has a strong impact on the values of ￿CR
t and ￿CS
t .
This implies that the revenue loss in 1998, for instance, might be higher than the
average loss and has to interpreted with caution. Accordingly, revenue losses found
for bust years like 1983 are likely to underestimate the average revenue losses.
4.4 Taxing income from rent and leasing
As pointed out in section 3, taxable income from rent and leasing is mostly neg-
ative under the existing German tax system. This is mainly due to generous
depreciation rules which are probably meant to neutralize the negative e⁄ect of
rent regulation on real estate investment. In our calculations, we have assumed
that the subsidization of real investment through the tax system will simply be ab-
olished in a consumption tax system. A possible objection to this approach would
be that the subsidies implicit in the current tax system will have to be replaced by
explicit subsidies of real estate investment. In this case, we would underestimate
the revenue losses of switching to a consumption tax system. We therefore report
the results for the case where we assume that the tax treatment of income from
14rent and leasing remains as it is. The tax revenue e⁄ects are computed by mul-
tiplying the tax base e⁄ects with top marginal rates and including the imputed
corporate taxes (as in table 3).
1983 (West) 1986 (West) 1989 (West) 1992 (West) 1995 (West) 1998 (Total)
Income from rent and leasing -27,67 -28,02 -6,88 -10,00 -18,62 -28,24
R-base 17,56 9,56 -78,10 4,86 31,32 -51,76
S-base -29,29 -47,80 -49,42 -80,75 -52,59 -90,77
R-base 15,62 13,05 -41,21 13,31 23,66 -19,81
S-base -13,68 -22,91 -23,22 -37,55 -23,79 -41,66
Total effects on the tax base (in billion DM)
Gain or loss in tax revenue (in billion DM)
Table 4: Income from rent and leasing and the tax base effects in billion DM when
income from rent and leasing is taxed as in the current system
Table 4 shows that a switch to an S-base would now yield revenue losses for all
years, and the overall revenue losses are higher.
5 A measure of the e⁄ective tax rate on the nor-
mal return to capital
Gordon, Kalambokidis & Slemrod (2003) use the approach presented above to
develop the concept of a backward-looking measure of the e⁄ective marginal tax
rate (EMTR) on investment. However, they concentrate on conceptual issues and
do not apply their measure 9.
Here, we apply this method to the data presented above and extend the analysis
on the individual level. Our goal is to present a simple macro-economic measure
of the e⁄ective taxation of capital income, or more precisely, of the normal return
to capital.
As we pointed out in the previous sections, capital taxation in Germany takes
place at both the ￿rm and the individual level. Since Germany can be considered
as a small, open economy, the ￿rm and the individual level need not be linked
at all. Since measuring the tax burden on capital income in other countries than
Germany is beyond the scope of this paper, we concentrate on the intersection of
both sets, i.e. we analyze the taxation of capital which is owned by households in
Germany and held by ￿rms in Germany.
9Furthermore, they abstract from personal taxes and make some other critical assumptions.
In Becker & Fuest (2004), we discuss the methodology and the e⁄ects of relaxing some of these
assumptions. Then, we propose a method of computing the EMTR without relying on those
assumptions and apply it to German ￿rm level data.
15The e⁄ective tax rate ￿ on capital income could be de￿ned as:
￿ =
~ $ ￿ $
~ $
(14)
with ~ $ the pretax return to capital and $ the after-tax return. Denote the
e⁄ective tax rate on capital income at the ￿rm level by mF and at the household
level by mH. Then, we can write:
(1 ￿ ￿) ~ $ = (1 ￿ mF)(1 ￿ mH) ~ $ = $ (15)
Usually these measure combine the tax payments and a referential value like
pro￿t or income. In our case, mF and mH are de￿ned as:
mF =
TC ￿ TR
income from the ￿rms￿capital
(16)
where TR has to be replaced by TS when the shift to a S-base tax is considered;






h=1 Eh ￿ E5 ￿ E6
￿
income from the households￿capital
(17)
Finally, we need to specify the denominators. We do not refer to taxable income
reported in the household tax return data because these ￿gures already all kinds
of arti￿cial reduction of the tax base10. Instead, we suppose that, in general, the
capital market is in equilibrium, which means that the ex-post return to capital is
equal to the short-term risk-free bond yield.
Thus, we approximate income values ￿n from capital (see the denominators in
equations (16) and (17)) by
￿n = r(K
n + B
n) with n = F;H (18)
where F and H stand for ￿rms and households, respectively. We have data
on the households￿￿nancial and real wealth from the German Central Bank (see
Deutsche Bundesbank (1999)). The households￿net wealth grew from 8 209 bn
DM in 1990 to 12 092 bn DM in 199711.
10Think for example of tax avoidance and evasion activities which are supposed to play an
important role in the taxation of capital income, see e.g. Cnossen (1996).
11For calculating ￿ for the years 1992 and 1995 we need the net wealth of West German
households. Unfortunately, we only know that in 1990 West German wealth presented 95% of
the totality and 91% in 1997. We take the 1997 value which may lead to an overestimation of
the e⁄ective capital income tax rate. The 1992 and 1995 presented in table 5 may thus be too
high.
16In order to compute ￿ = mF +mH ￿mFmH, we further have to make assump-
tions on the average tax rates on corporate and individual income. We therefore
report several scenarios ranging from lower values to the top marginal rate for
both types of income.
Table 5 reports values of ￿ in di⁄erent scenarios concerning the average tax
rates on corporate and individual income.
S-base
1992 40,0% 45,0% 50,0% 59,4% 1992 40,0% 45,0% 50,0% 59,4%
40,0% -6,5% -7,6% -8,7% -10,8% 40,0% 6,8% 7,4% 7,9% 9,0%
45,0% -6,2% -7,3% -8,4% -10,5% 45,0% 7,1% 7,6% 8,2% 9,2%
50,0% -5,9% -7,0% -8,1% -10,2% 50,0% 7,4% 7,9% 8,5% 9,5%
55,0% -5,5% -6,6% -7,7% -9,8% 55,0% 7,7% 8,2% 8,8% 9,8%
1995 40,0% 45,0% 50,0% 56,6% 1995 40,0% 45,0% 50,0% 56,6%
40,0% -11,4% -12,9% -14,5% -16,5% 40,0% 4,8% 5,3% 5,8% 6,5%
45,0% -11,3% -12,8% -14,3% -16,3% 45,0% 4,9% 5,4% 5,9% 6,6%
50,0% -11,2% -12,7% -14,2% -16,2% 50,0% 5,0% 5,5% 6,0% 6,6%
57,0% -11,0% -12,5% -14,1% -16,0% 57,0% 5,1% 5,6% 6,1% 6,8%
1998 40,0% 45,0% 50,0% 56,0% 1998 40,0% 45,0% 50,0% 56,0%
40,0% 2,8% 3,1% 3,3% 3,6% 40,0% 11,5% 12,8% 14,1% 15,7%
45,0% 3,0% 3,2% 3,4% 3,7% 45,0% 11,6% 12,9% 14,3% 15,8%
50,0% 3,1% 3,3% 3,6% 3,8% 50,0% 11,7% 13,0% 14,4% 15,9%















Table 5: Effective tax rate on capital income with different scenarios of the average tax




























Note that the lower right values in each quadrant represent the upper bound of
￿ but not a realistic estimation of the true value. If one takes the 50%-assumption
for both the ￿rm and individual level, ￿ ranges from ￿14;2% in 1995 (R-base
scenario) to 14:4% in 1998 (S-base scenario). As we pointed out above, 1998 is not
at a very typical point in the business cycle and should therefore be considered as
a relatively high value.
Furthermore, it should be noted that these results are only valid for capital
income which is taxed in Germany at both levels. The low levels are not too
surprising since not all types of capital income are subject to taxation.
Finally we should say that this type of e⁄ective tax rate measure is highly
sensitive to business cycle e⁄ects as the broad variance of values in table 5 suggests.
The reason is that the tax base of one period depends on the investment decisions
of former periods since depreciation deductions always refer to past investment
projects. In Becker & Fuest (2004) we construct a backward looking e⁄ective tax
rate measure which is not sensitive to cyclical business investment.
176 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the revenue e⁄ects of tax reforms which would
replace the existing tax system by a consumption tax system of the R-base or the
S-base type. The most important result is that the revenue losses which would
be caused by a consumption tax reform are surprisingly low. For some years, we
even ￿nd revenue gains. These results imply that the current German tax system
collects very little revenue from taxing capital income. Next to this, our analysis
has shown that the revenue e⁄ects depend on the type of consumption tax system.
The revenue e⁄ects of a switch to an R-base are much more volatile than those of
introducing an S-base. Moreover, the yearly revenue e⁄ects are strongly in￿ uenced
by business cycle conditions.
From these revenue ￿gures, we deducted a simple backward-looking measure
of the e⁄ective tax rate on capital income in Germany. Again, we ￿nd relatively
low levels and, in some years, even negative values which indicates a subsidization
of capital income.
These results should be interpreted in the light of several limitations of our
study, which are mostly due to data problems. Firstly, we had to assume that the
tax treatment of the ￿nancial sector remains unchanged. Secondly, we assumed
that capital income and income from rent and leasing at the household level is
untaxed under a consumption tax system. Thirdly, we have assumed that the tax
treatment of pension income will not be changed by the consumption tax reform.
We also had to calculate the revenue e⁄ects of the consumption tax reform on the
basis of top marginal personal and corporate income tax rates, which implies that
we may overestimate the magnitude of the revenue e⁄ects.
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